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       Having discussed briefly the principles upon which modern rabbis discuss new questions, especially in the medical realm, I will now turn to questions of fertility. As noted above, the first commandment is to be fruitful and multiply, and the Bible treats infertility as tragedy. Jews are generally prepared to make major sacrifices to have children, and then to raise and educate them. The stereotype of the Jewish mother is neither all negative nor all wrong.
        Infertility is a problem which affects between ten and fifteen percent of all couples. In the last century, new techniques were pioneered to help them overcome this condition. Sometimes it is possible to identify a specific problem of one member of the couple, but often the reasons for infertility are unknown. Tradition tells us that there are three partners in every child: the father, the mother, and God. Modern medicine and reproductive technology add significantly to the number of partners. Two of the most well known procedures for infertile couples are artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization (test-tube babies). Both attempt to achieve pregnancy without actual sexual relations. Artificial insemination, the introduction of sperm into a woman's reproductive tract by mechanical means, can be from the husband (known as AIH) or from a donor (AID). In both cases the woman is assumed to be fertile, and it is the man who has a problem, which can be solved either by artificial use of his own or a donor's sperm. This procedure raises a number of questions, notably in the case of AID (especially when the donor's identity is kept secret, as is the normal procedure). In the Jewish legal and legendary tradition, there are indeed references to pregnancy without intercourse, known as "bath impregnation" and "sheet impregnation". The rabbis assumed that a woman could become pregnant after contact with semen left in a bathtub or on sheets, unlikely as that may be. There seems to be no opprobrium attached to such pregnancies, even when the semen is not that of the woman's husband. Nevertheless, women are warned not to lie on the sheets of anyone other than of their husband lest the child conceived in this manner eventually unknowingly marry his or her paternal sibling (from the anonymous donor, as it were). Although the traditional discussions of these phenomena do not assume modern reproductive methods, they are adduced as precedents for contemporary decision-making. The question arises: what can be learned from the precedents of bath and sheet impregnation?
        Some rabbis derive the principle that a child so conceived, even from a donor, is not in any way blemished. The non-sexual introduction of sperm not of one's husband does not constitute adultery, and therefore it is permissible. Others have ruled against these procedures. Since a woman is enjoined from lying on sheets of a man who is not her husband, lest she become pregnant and her child not know his or her paternal siblings, even though this is an uncommon occurrence, then she certainly cannot be allowed to undergo a procedure whose whole intent is to achieve pregnancy without revealing the genetic father. In addition, there are rabbis who distinguish between the involuntary introduction of donor sperm through a bath or a sheet, which does not constitute adultery, and the purposeful injection of donor sperm which would be adultery.
        To show how these different opinions work in practice, let me quote first from two Reform Jewish responsa published in the Proceedings of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, an official Reform Jewish rabbinical publication. (It should be remembered that generally Reform Judaism does not accept the binding authority of Jewish law, and, therefore, some would say that a Reformlegal responsum is an oxymoron - a contradiction in terms). Rabbi Solomon Freehof, the Reform movement's most eminent legal authority (died 1990), cited the various precedents, as well as contemporary Orthodox responsa, and concluded: "My own opinion would be that the possibility of the child marrying one of his own close blood kin is far fetched, but that since, according to Jewish law the wife has committed no sin and the child is Kosher, then the process of artificial insemination should be permitted." ¹ The emphasis, then, is on the lack of opprobrium attached to bath and sheet pregnancy even with "donor" sperm.
        In contrast, Rabbi Alexander Guttmann (d. 1994), professor at the Reform Hebrew Union College, wrote that the precedents normally cited are irrelevant for artificial insemination since they all deal with involuntary act, and "Jewish law mostly, though not always, clearly distinguishes between accidental and premeditated deed. I do not believe that we do justice to Jewish Law or to Judaism by disregarding its concepts and principles in an effort to force certain conclusions, one way or the other." ² For Rabbi Guttmann, then, the issue is whether the conception through donor sperm was voluntary or not. He concludes that it would seem that artificial insemination from a donor should not be allowed, but other aspects of Judaism should be explored as well, "in order to arrive at a conclusion reflecting Judaism at its best." The desire "to reflect Judaism at its best" is not specifically a legal category, but it is used in this case to suggest prohibiting AID.
        The disagreement about the permissibility of donor insemination is not restricted to the Reform movement. In a number of famous (some say infamous) responsa from the late 1950's and early 1960's, the Orthodox Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (one of the foremost halakhic arbiters of the twentieth century, 1895-1986) ruled that artificial insemination from an anonymous donor is permitted (at least in the case brought before him where the couple's desire for children was great). He reasoned that such insemination is not adultery (no forbidden intercourse occurred) and that in America, the donors are likely to be non-Jewish (and therefore there would be no problem of sibling marriage, for reasons too complicated to discuss here). ³ This decision was fiercely attacked because of considerations cited above, for instance, that there is a difference between involuntary bath and sheet impregnation and voluntary artificial insemination. Some critics maintained that the purposeful introduction of donor sperm into a married woman is adultery. Others argued that in the places where Jews live and at the hospitals which they frequent, the donors are likely to be Jews, and, therefore, sibling marriage is a problem. Still others argued that if the donor were non-Jewish, artificial insemination would introduce "defective" elements into the Jewish people. Because of the outcry, Rabbi Feinstein eventually withdrew his permission, but he did not back away from his legal reasoning. ⁴ While there is no unanimity today among Orthodox rabbis, I would say that the consensus is to allow husband artificial insemination under certain circumstances with certain guidelines, but to prohibit donor insemination.
        In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a technique in which a woman's ova are removed from her body, fertilized in a petri dish (the "test tube" of popular culture), allowed to grow into a tiny embryo, and then returned to her uterus for gestation and eventual birth. This technique is used especially when the woman's fallopian tubes are blocked, preventing a natural pregnancy. IVF can also be used in conjunction with a surrogate mother, when the genetic mother wishes a baby conceived from her own ovum but is incapable or unwilling to carry the baby to term. The fertilized embryo is implanted in the surrogate mother, who, in essence, provides a donor uterus. The case of in vitro fertilization is similar to artificial insemination in some ways (impregnation without sexual relations) but different in others (the birth mother may not be the one who provided the ovum). In general, those rabbis who allow artificial insemination from husband will most likely allow in vitro fertilization using the ovum and sperm from a married couple with the wife carrying the fetus to term. (There remains the problem of the disposal of any unused embryos). Some authorities object to IVF, even between two spouses, because they believe it will lead to impermissible combinations of sperm, ova, and uterus providers. Those who do allow donor insemination would likewise be likely to permit donor in vitro, and those who prohibit AID would also likely prohibit donor IVF.
        The real question arises with host motherhood, that is, when the birthing mother is not the genetic mother. Who is the mother from the standpoint of Judaism? This question is important in order to determine the religious status of the child, questions of inheritance and respect for parents, and even whom the child can marry without committing incest. These questions are so new that there is no consensus, some rabbis arguing for the birth mother, others for the genetic mothers. To obviate such dilemmas, most traditional rabbis would oppose host motherhood.
        Strictly legal considerations are not the only ones that enter the halakhic discourse. Thus, the late Orthodox Chief Rabbi of Great Britain Immanuel Jakobovits writes: "To use another person as 'incubator' and then take from her the child she carried and delivered, for a fee, is a revolting degradation of maternity and an affront to human dignity." ⁵ That is hardly a halakhic argument although undoubtedly based on considerations found in the Jewish tradition. ⁶
        A slightly different view is offered by Rabbi David Feldman, a member of the more traditional wing of the Conservative movement: "Of course, Jewish law would never sanction recourse to any such methods [host mothering] merely to spare one the inconvenience of pregnancy and childbearing, and certainly not in order to insure some package of genetic characteristics, such as blue eyes or tall stature. But where there is no natural alterative, these resourceful ways of bringing about the desideratum become acceptable. Enabling a woman to fulfill the maternal yearning, or a couple to fulfill the mitzvah [commandment], is itself a mitzvah." ⁷ Here, too, legal and extralegal considerations are at play.
        Despite rabbinic misgivings, the implantation of fertilized embryos into hosts who are not the genetic mothers is currently in practice; hence, there are halakhic discussions as to the status of children born as a result of this technique. Both for those who would permit and those who would prohibit host motherhood, an important question still remains: in the case where there is a host mother, who is the mother from the Jewish point of view? Rabbi Feldman is unclear, but he seems to favor a solution in which both women are to be considered mothers of the same child. Among Orthodox rabbis, a majority would now seem to favor declaring the birth mother as mother, but others favor the genetic mother. ⁸